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Abstract 
 
The increasing percentage of individuals aged 65 years and older and decreasing total 
fertility rate is contributing to European Union‟s demographic shift and increase in 
government expenditures. These changing demographics are calling for changes in 
macro-economic policies, particularly monetary policies. The increase in older 
population is placing a strain on governmental budgets calling for an increased 
expenditure on health care delivery, pensions, and long-term care. Just these factors 
alone are becoming a challenge for policy makers in the European Union, specifically, 
the EU-15 countries.  
Thus, measures need to be taken to curve the current macroeconomic environment 
based on the demographic shift that is taking place and it projected for the future of 
2060. It is essential that economic and financial policy makers and leaders develop 
economic plans within the EU-countries that focus on increasing economic growth, 
maintaining inflation, sustaining savings and investments. This can be accomplished 
using the numerous policy recommendations that are described in the current research.  
In order to examine the factors of demographics influencing macroeconomics and 
analyse their impact on EU-15 countries individually and on a whole, empirical data was 
obtained from government agency statistical websites for EU-15 and individual 
countries comprising the group. The demographic data obtained was correlated with the 
economic data in order to establish a relationship. The statistical data was comprised of 
birth rate, total fertility rate, ageing population, youth population, unemployment, 
government expenditures, economic growth, capital, and inflation.  
After the completion of data analysis and review of academic literature, results and 
discussions were carried out in the present paper. This also included potential 
recommendations for a more effective improvement on the macro-economy of EU-15 
countries.  
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Chapter – 1; Introduction 
 
It is evident that the population of the world is aging, in all countries regardless of 
economic strength. With age, people begin to work less compared to younger adults; 
earning far less what is their cost of consumption. As countries grow richer, labour 
supply at older ages begin to decrease, while consumption at older ages increase 
compared to the younger, specifically caused by the rise in costs of publicly provided 
health care. Due to this population aging is considered to be a burden of expense for 
economic development. A similar shift is occurring within the European Union (EU); 
facing a challenge demographically in the future with concerns of the ageing population, 
growing life expectancy, and increased immigration flow.  
The EU as a whole had witnessed a drastic drop in fertility rate to as low as 1.47 
children form per female; which began to increase again in 2008 to reach 1.60 children 
per female (Billari, 2008). The considerably low fertility rate results to a decrease in 
younger population that will be able replace retirement age workers in the Euro 
workforce. According to Maddaloni et al. (2006) there is a risk in the potential future of 
the Union being overwhelmed by an increasing population of senior-retried citizens, 
without adequate population of younger workers to fund state welfare programs; such 
as retirement programs, through taxation. A declining EU population due to low fertility 
rates suggest an economic contraction or a possible crisis without immigration to the EU 
supplementing for this (Yoon et al., 2014). The issues of low fertility rates and rising life 
expectancy will have extensive repercussions on issues such as long-term growth 
prospects, financial market development, financing of state-welfare, and other 
macroeconomic components.  
Against this background, the main focus of this research will be to analyse the major 
demographic trends in the EU, particular, EU-15 countries using currently available 
projects. It will examine the current and potential implications for labour markets, 
financial markets, and public finances. The paper will also focus on economic, social 
and political changes since 2000 on the EU-15 countries which include;  
  
 Austria 
 Belgium 
 Denmark 
 Finland 
 France 
 Germany 
 Greece 
 Ireland 
 Italy 
 Luxembourg 
 Netherlands 
 Portugal 
 Spain 
 Sweden 
 United Kingdom 
Further details of the research aims and objectives of the study being undertaken are 
given below;   
1.1 Research aims 
 
The aims of the current research are;  
 Address research questions: How changing demographics in EU-15 impact the 
macro-economy of the area and EU as whole? 
 Develop an understanding of how demographic factors such as low fertility rate, 
increasing aging population, and increase in immigration within the EU-15 
countries impact the macro-economy? 
 Investigate major factors, including shifting demographic trends of EU-15. 
Highlight the challenges faced by financial policy makers, such as fewer people 
in population of working ages, smaller taxes to finance social security payments, 
and reduction in rate of scientific and other innovations.  
 Impact of migrant populations in EU-15‟s economy.  
 Using wide-ranging research to identify various measures that can be taken to 
improve the demographic rates and the economy as whole through strategies 
that focus on macroeconomic reform. The particular aim is intended to be 
completed using qualitative research with substantial empirical evidence to 
support it.  
 Identify responsibility of policy makers and other stakeholders in EU-15 in 
regards to economic development within the area.    
  
Analyse the effectiveness of current strategies and practices being used to curve 
the demographic shift and macroeconomic environment to aid economic variables 
such as economic growth, inflation, savings and investments 
 
2.3 Research objectives 
 
The research objectives are;  
 To review the low fertility rate trends in the EU-15 areas since 2000; outline how 
such trends are impacting the overall economic conditions in EU. A variety of 
sources will be used to obtain data such as Eurostat, and statistics stated from 
the UN, World Bank, and IMF. This will allow a correlation to be made with low 
fertility rates economic growth. 
 Review ageing population trends in the EU-15 area since 2000; analyse how 
such trends have impacted the overall economic growth in the EU-15. The same 
sources as identified above will be used to develop a correlation with ageing 
population and economic growth in EU-15 countries.  
 Explore the demographic change in light of potential for future labour force 
shortages. An analysis of unemployment rate of young people; as defined 
between ages 18-30. Based on these economic changes the implications of 
monetary policies will be analysed. All data will be taken from central government 
agencies.  
 After examining the obtained data, arguments will be presented on why there is a 
need to change certain macroeconomic policies and political policies to regulate 
the Euro economy.  
 Using secondary research to obtain insight on historic and current 
macroeconomic, social, and political policies that impacted the trends. Analysis 
of the data obtained.  
 Evaluate the current policies of EU-15 for population growth to accommodate 
their economic stability. Evaluation of economic policies, particularly monetary 
policy to maintain economic stability.  
  
 Investigate thoroughly the current policies, strategies and systems in place for 
macro-economic stability in EU-15 and EU on a whole. Identify and explain the 
major concerns of the demographic shift. Present plausible recommendations 
based on the data analyse with the results and discussions.  
The main aim of the research is to examine the impact that changing demographics on 
macro-economy components in order to provide recommendations using evidences 
from the research to improve economic conditions. Therefore, the fundamental research 
question of this paper is;  
How has changing demographics in EU-15 countries impacted the macro-economic 
environment of the area and European Union as a whole? 
This research questions will be addressed by analysing the various factors that affect 
the macro-economy. Recommendations are then provided in the form of creating new 
strategies to control the macro-economy to remain stable in the face of a declining 
population and ageing population.   
  
Chapter – 2; Literature Review 
 
2.1 Overview of literature review 
 
This section of the paper will present the statistical facts of demographic shifts since 
2000 up to 2014, and a projection to 2050 based on Eurostat data. Furthermore, the 
literature review will also analyse the statistical figures related to the macroeconomic 
factors as discussed in the previous chapter of the outline. This section will also 
examine the social, political, and economic policies implemented by stakeholders to 
curve the economic situation. By analysing the policy and data, the researcher should 
be able to divulge further into which policies have led to the development of risk to the 
EU-15 macroeconomic environment. 
2.2 EU population fertility rate 
 
The EU population is facing a significant decline in new births with an increase in the 
ageing population. Research conducted by economists in the Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) of the European Commission agreed Eurostat‟s 
baseline scenario that EU‟s overall population is expected to decrease slightly over the 
next 50 years, with 372 million people in 1995 to an approximated 367 million people by 
2050. There is also a prediction of increased ageing individuals in the population with 
old age dependency ratios expecting to double from 23% in 1995 to 47% in 2050 
(Morrow and Roeger, 2011). Eurostat and UN projects which are based on fertility, life 
expectancy, and migration, reveal a slow but sure decline in Euro area total population 
growth from 2005 to 2050 with differences see in the pace by which the decline is to 
take place (Morrow and Roeger, 2011). Based on a report developed by Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, it was the mid-1970s that European Union 
countries were reproducing at replacement levels which is more than two children per 
woman (Brooks, 2015). However, in 2014 the ratio of children to women was 1.6 
(Brooks, 2015). There are a few exceptions within the EU-15 countries that are not 
following a trend of low fertility rate. France has risen to a ratio of two children per 
  
woman in 2012 an increase from 1980 with a ratio of 1.95 children per woman (Brooks, 
2015).  
The figure below illustrates that birth rate crude, which is live births during the years 
2000-2014 per 1,000 people, estimated in mid-year by the World Bank. The figure 
focuses on EU-15 countries within these years.                           
 
Figure 1- Birth Rate in EU-15 2000-2013 (Source; World Bank) 
Data from the CIA revealed recent trends of birth rate within the EU-15 countries. Figure 
2 illustrates the average annual births during the year 2014 per 1,000 persons in the 
population at midyear.  
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Figure 2- Average Annual Birth Rate of EU-15 in 2014 (Source; CIA World Fact book) 
The European Union had also recorded trends of total fertility rate (TFR) from 1960-
2013 based on live births per woman. It should be noted that total fertility rates is a 
synthetic rate with the measure of fertility of an „imaginary’ woman who is passing 
through reproductive life. It is based on age-specific fertility of women in their child-
bearing years, which is considered between the ages of 15- 44 or 15- 49 (Bulatao, 
1984).  Figure 3 illustrates the TFR between 1960 to the year 2013, for EU-15 countries 
based on information obtained from Eurostat.  
Based on these trends, on an average European couples living in the EU-15 countries 
are having an average of 1.5 children. However, this rate is below the required 2.1 rate 
which is needed to replace the ageing population. Historically speaking, factors of infant 
mortality and food shortages had contributed to regulating the population level, 
however, these factors have ceased to exist in the European Union, due to its rapid 
development, strong economy, and increase in technology after World War II. According 
to Capri (2010) the reason for the decline of birth rate and fertility in the EU countries is 
fewer marriages, changing family patterns, growing prosperity and use along with 
availability of contraception.  
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Based on empirical projections the European Commission (2012) has claimed that if 
fertility rates further fall to 1.3 children per couple within the next 100 years, there is a 
chance that the population would fall to less than ¼ of what its current size is presently. 
Capri (2011) has asserted that new family arrangements and lifestyles are impacting the 
rates of fertility. According to Espenshade et al. (2003) there is a growing number of 
women that are having children at a later time in their life or chose not to have children 
at all due to concerns of their potential effect on the careers of these women. According 
to The European Commission (2012), the Robert Bosch Foundation found that the costs 
of conceiving another child coupled with fears about the society that these children will 
grow up in is the main reason why couples in the European Union are not having 
children. The study also found that women in general within these European countries 
would like to have more children than they actually have.  
 
Figure 3- Total Fertility Rate 1960-2013 of EU-15 (Source; Eurostat) 
  
2.3 Ageing Population in EU-15 countries 
 
The portion of elderly individuals in European Union member states has increased 
significantly over the last few decades. According to Trippel et al. (2011), the rise in the 
population of the elderly is due to low fertility and longer life expectancy. There is 
evidence of variations of the ageing population between EU countries and time periods 
of its occurrence that has contributed to factors of longer life expectancy and lower 
fertility. According to Christensen et al. (2009), since the 1970s mortality of elder 
people, aged 65 and above has fallen substantively throughout the European countries. 
The decrease in mortality rate, rather than low fertility, is considered to be the main 
contributor of the ageing population in Europe (Preston et al., 1989) which has resulted 
from decreasing mortality from cardiovascular diseases within older people (Crimmins 
et al., 2010). There are various factors that have attributed to the decreased in such a 
disease mainly from the combination of improve lifestyles, prevention, and better 
treatment in these countries.  
According to Mackenbach et al. (2011) the European Union has seen improved delivery 
of health care which may have been a strong contributing factor to decrease mortality in 
the older population in the 21st century. There are three theories of population ageing 
that are able to reflect on the current trends in the European Union based on 
improvement of delivery of health care. According to the compression of morbidity 
theory, established in 1980, Fries (1980) argues in this theory that life expectancy was 
close to the maximum and the future improvements in medical care and health 
behaviours would result in the delay of morbidity but not mortality. Thus, there will be a 
reduction in the number of unhealthy years that are lived as a proportion of life 
expectancy (Fries, 1980). However, Gruenberg (1977) and Kramer (1980) argued in 
their expansion of morbidity theory that contrary to Fries (1980) beliefs, the same 
medical progress would increase the survival of the frail and result to an expansion of 
unhealthy relative to healthy life-year. Finally, Manton (1982) proposed the dynamic 
equilibrium theory that argued an increase in survival is equipoised by improved control 
on chronic diseases, thus keeping the proportion of life lived in good health more or less 
  
constant; this is considered as the mid-point of the two extreme futures that was 
proposed by Fries (1980) and Gruenberg (1977) and Kramer (1980).       
The demographic factor of altering birth rates has also impacted the ageing population. 
The baby boom after World War II is linked to the current increase in people reaching 
old age being significantly large. According to the European Commission (2009) the 
ratio of people aged 65 years or older in the EU has exceeded that of individuals aged 
15 year or younger in 2008. The European Commission (2009) has projected that by 
2060 twice as many people will be 65 years or older as will be those 15 years and 
younger. Furthermore, there will be a rise in the number of very old people; categorised 
as those aged 80 years or older, will be more prominent (European Commission, 2009). 
The ratio of very old people is anticipated to triple between the years 2008 and 2060 
(European Commission, 2009).  
Figure 4 below shows the data of EU-15 countries of the European Union which 
illustrates how population shares of different age groups between the ages of; 014-, 15-
24, 25-49, 50-64, 65-79, and 80+, has changed in last 50 years and will continue to 
change in the future 50 years.           
 
Figure 4- Population shares of Age Groups in EU-15 (Source; UN World Population Prospects, 2002; Eurostat, 2004) 
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According to the United States Census Bureau‟s International Database, about one in 
five Western Europeans were 65 years old or older in 2014 (Brooks, 2015). However, 
projections of 2030 hypothesise that this will rise to one in four. Projections of 2060 
hypothesise that the population of EU will be slightly higher, with those of age 65 and 
over are to rise from 17 per cent to 30 per cent (EU Economic and Financial Affairs, 
2012). Of the EU-15 countries, by the mid-1980s, UK was one of the most aged 
countries in Europe, by retaining a median age of 35.4 in 1985. By 1990, the UK‟s 
median age was 35.8, considered to be slightly higher than the overall median age of 
the 15 countries in the EU which was 35.2 years. The median ages of EU-15 compared 
to the UK can be illustrated in figure 5.  
 
Figure 5- Median Age of UK vs. EU-15 (Source; Office of National Statistics, 2011 & Eurostat, 2011) 
 
The United Kingdom has aged more drastically that compared to the average of EU-15 
countries from 1990 to 2010. According to Office for National Statistics (2010) a key 
contributing factors was the high rate of fertility in the UK over the last decade since 
2010 compared to other European countries. EU-15 populations‟ median age in 2010 
was 40.9 years, which was 1.2 years higher than the median age of UK, being 39.7 
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years. However, the Republic of Ireland, which has shown trends of the highest fertility 
consistently, is the EU-15 member state with the least aged population, having a 
median age of 34.5 years. E other hand, Germany, a EU-15 country which has 
consecutively shown trends of low fertility, is the EU-15 state with the most aged 
population, with the median age of 44.2 years in 2010. To strike a comparison in 
changing trends of percentage population with older individuals, figure 6 below 
illustrates the percentage of population in 1985, which will be compared to the 
percentage population in 2010 in figure 7.  
 
Figure 6- Percentage of persons aged 65 and over EU-15, 1985 (Source; Office of National Statistics, 1985; Eurostat, 1985) 
 
Between the period of 1985 to 2010, the percentage of older persons increased in all of 
the Eu-15 countries. Particularly, in the UK, the percentage of the population aged 65 
and over increased to 17 per cent by 2010 (Office of National Statistics, 2010). This 
increase in the UK isn‟t as great as the majority of the EU-15 countries, with UK 
dropping to the middle rankings and Germany reaching the highest ranking with 21 per 
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cent of individuals aged 65 and over, and yet, Ireland remained the lowest of the 
rankings with 11 per cent of individuals aged 65 and over in the population; as 
illustrated in figure 7.  
 
Figure 7- Percentage of persons aged 65 and over EU-15, 2010 (Source; National Statistics, 2010; Eurostat, 2010) 
 The Office of National Statistics (2010) had projected that the population in the EU-15 
countries are going to become more aged between 2010 and 2035 as the percentage of 
older people in the populations continues to steadily increase. It is hypothesised that by 
2035, 23 per cent of the UK population is to be 65 years of age or over. However, the 
UK will rank the lowest of the EU-15 countries to have lower proportion of aged 
individuals. (Office of National Statistics, 2010). Based on figure 8, Germany is 
projected to maintain its position as the most aged country with 31 per cent of the 
population being 65 years or older, while the Republic of Ireland will retained its position 
as the least aged population with 19 per cent of the population being 65 years or older.  
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Figure 8- Percentage of population aged 65 and over EU-15, 2035 (Source; Office of National Statistics, 2010) 
 
2. 4 Economic consequences of ageing population 
 
Based on the demographic shifts, particularly the increase in those individuals aged 65 
years and older, there will be economic consequences directly linked to the trends. 
According to the European Commission‟s Economic and Financial Affairs report (2012), 
the total number of workers is projected to decrease by 15.7 million over the forecasted 
projection to 195.6 million by 2060. Based on this drastic decline in the workforce, the 
effect will act as a drag on growth and per capita income resulting in the decline of 
potential growth (Hartlapp and Schmid, 2008). The projected potential growth is 
hypothesised to congregate to below 1.5 per cent in real-terms on the long-term of the 
European Union (Hartlapp and Schmid, 2008). According to the European Commission 
(2012) these demographic changes discussed in the previous section will have a 
significant impact on public finances of the EU. Based on current policies in regards to 
age related expenditure (i.e. pensions, health-care, and long-term care), there is a 
projected increase of 4.1 per cent points to an estimate 29 per cent of GDP between 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
G
er
m
an
y
It
al
y
A
u
st
ri
a
Th
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
G
re
ec
e
P
o
rt
u
ga
l
Fi
n
la
n
d
Sp
ai
n
Fr
an
ce
D
en
m
ar
k
B
el
gi
u
m
Sw
e
d
en
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
gd
o
m
Lu
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
Ir
el
an
d
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
Projected Percentage of population aged 65 and 
over EU-15, 2035 
  
2010 and 2060. Just public expenditure on itself is projected to rise by 1.5 percentage 
points to an estimate of 13 per cent of GDP by 2060.  
 
Figure 9- Pension expenditure projections (Source; Eurostat, 2015) 
Between the years 2000 and 2007, EU‟s public debt was closer to the reference level of 
60 per cent of GDP, only reaching the lowest point of 59 per cent at the end of 2007 
period. The economic crisis that emerged with the Subprime bubble burst led to 
significant economic changes. The years 2007 and 2012 saw an increase in public debt 
by 26.3 percentage points resulting in 85.3 per cent of public debt in the EU. In order to 
fight the recession, various EU-15 member states had implemented an expansionary 
and counter-cyclical fiscal policies (Eurostat, 2013). According to Hartlapp and Schmid 
(2008) many banks and other sectors were temporarily but considerably supported by 
state aid that resulted in mammoth public spending. General government debt-to-GDP 
ratios within member states ranged to 10.1 per cent in Estonia to 156.9 per cent in 
Greece. Member states of the EU-15‟s Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and United Kingdom remained 60 per cent 
above the Eurozone reference line in 2012. European Commission (2010) asserts that 
in the years leading up to the financial crisis, specific countries in the EU that faced the 
greatest amount of public finances deterioration had a mix of external imbalances but 
with booking credit and domestic demand, on the other hand, the EU countries that 
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experienced the smallest public finances deterioration had shown stable or falling 
macro-economic risks. 
 
Figure 10- General Government Expenditure on Health EU-15 (Source; Eurostat, 2013) 
The accessibility of health services provided by the government and institutions is 
measured through public expenditure on health and the number of doctors and hospital 
beds available to the population of a country (Rechel et al., 2009). The services 
described are of great need to the elderly population as they face more health related 
issues at this point in life. Figure 10 gives an average of EU-15 countries‟ general 
expenditure on health while figure 11 shows the annual general government health 
expenditure by each of the EU-15 countries in 2013. It is seen that public expenditure 
on health is considered to be high in EU-15 countries as EU has a greater share of 
population aged 65 and over.  
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Figure 11- Annual general government health expenditure, by country, 2013 (Source; Eurostat, 2015) 
Furthermore, to assess the impact on economy, the activity rate of the older population 
of a country is considered to be a major indicator of active ageing. Based on the figure 
below; Germany has an elderly population that is the most active while Luxembourg has 
the most inactive of the elder population aged 65 and older.    
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Figure 12- Activity rate of people aged 65 or older, by EU-15 country, 2014 (Source; Eurostat, 2015) 
2.5 Economic Growth in the EU- 15 countries  
 
The European Union‟s economy is considered to be heterogeneous with policies that 
vary tremendously from country to country, resulting in outcomes that also vary 
depending on each country. However, even with the diversity in economies there are 
certain vivid patterns that separates strong economies from weaker ones, or economies 
that are equally strong and weak. For example, Sweden is considered as the EU‟s best 
managed economies, but is also considered the worst (Economic Commission, 2015); 
while Greece and Spain have shown abstruse performance by doing well in some years 
and cataclysmically doing bad in other years.  
The EU-15 had witnessed robust economic growth between the years beginning with 
the end of World War II and the 1970s. At the time, the consolidated gross domestic 
product per capita had increased in EU-15 countries more than 70 per cent than 
compared to less than 50 per cent in 1945 (OECD, 2011). Unfortunately, by 2007, the 
GDP per capital in EU-15 countries had fell to 68 per cent. According to the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2011) the 
decrease in GDP per capital of EU-15 states is caused by persistently lower 
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productivity, lower employment, and less human capital; as Europe only surpasses 
developed countries like the United States in physical capital. The wide gap between 
the EU-15 and USA is attributed to the interaction between macroeconomic shocks in 
the 19702 and 1980s and the labour market institutions that were present during that 
time in Europe causing a rising in unemployment rate (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). 
Ark et al. (2008), however, assert that differences between the USA and EU-15 can be 
explained by a greater adoption of information and communication technologies and 
more rapid productivity in the US than compared to the EU-15.         
 
Figure 13- GDP per capital in EU-15 (1950-2012) (Source; Balcerowicz, 2013) 
 
The overall picture that is obtained from the analysis of the time period 1980-2007, is 
also important to show difference among the EU-15 countries. Different countries are 
known to display different growth performances during the 1980-2007 time period, with 
each of the EU-15 countries displaying different growth rates over time. Each of the 15 
countries can be categorised using „growth episodes‟ divided between accelerations 
and slowdowns, as seen in table 1. Each country that is either seeing an acceleration or 
slowdown are affected by factors of changes in systematic forces generally changing 
the institutional framework, the fiscal stance and the age structure of the population; and 
  
strong shocks, with persistent and strong accelerations of public and private spending 
driven by strong capital inflows and excessive growth of credit (Balcerowicz, 2013). 
 
Slowdown Episodes Size of Decrease Acceleration 
Episodes 
Size of 
Increase 
Sweden 1984-1995 -9.1 pp. Ireland 1988-2004 +38.6 pp. 
Italy 1993-2007 
-8.3 pp. 
Luxembourg 1985-
2007 +38.2 pp. 
Germany 1993-2004 -7.4 pp. Finland 1997-2007 +10.7 pp. 
Netherlands 1980-
1987 -6.4 pp. 
Sweden 2000-2007 
+7.4 pp. 
Greece 1980-1997 -6.1 pp. Greece 2000-2006 +7.2 pp. 
Finland 1989-1994 -4.4 pp. Portugal 1987-1991 +5.5 pp. 
France 1993-1999 -4.4 pp. Spain 1987-1991 +4.1 pp. 
Portugal 2001-2007 -2.1 pp.   
Spain 1980-1985 -1.7 pp.   
Belgium 1994-1998 -1.7 pp.   
Ireland 1982-1986 -1.8 pp.   
Table 1- Episode of acceleration and slowdowns among EU-15 states (Source; Conference Board Total Economy Database 
(TED)) 
Balcerowicz (2013) defines slowdowns as periods when the GDP per capita in a given 
country grew 1 percentage point or more slower than in the US for five years 
consecutively or longer. On the other hand, Balcerowicz (2013) describes accelerations 
as the periods when GDP per capita in a given country grew 0.5 percentage points 
faster than in the US for five years consecutively or longer.     
2.6 Savings, economic growth and demographic change 
 
It is evident from Mason (1988) study that there is a correlation between savings, 
economic growth, and demographic changes.  It is common amongst the majority of 
  
industrialised countries that there is a main concern toward population dynamics and 
economic growth which is more focused on the affect that a declining new population 
and growing ageing population has. According to Mason (1988) a quickly growing 
population needs increased investment to conserve the labour to capital ratio therefore 
its labour productivity. Aside from the basic relation that is present between population 
growth, savings and economic growth, the accretion of human capital, institutional and 
restructuring issues also play a vital role.  
Based on the study (Mason, 1988) there is empirical evidence that supports domestic 
savings being a major source of investment. Based on comparisons between countries 
in the EU-15 a correlation is revealed between gross domestic savings ratio and gross 
domestic investment ratio of .064 and the slope of corresponding regression being the 
value of 0.63. This particular value is calculated from one per cent of increase in 
savings from an increase in investment by 0.63 percentage points.  
On the contrary, Solow (1956) neoclassical growth model asserts that savings has no 
influence on the long term growth of total and per capita output due to the capital being 
dependent on increase of capital and labour ratio and requires an increase in share of 
output to replace and maintain the capital that is already of existence. Hence, Solow 
(1956) suggests that depreciation of capital has the possibility of ultimately leading to an 
excess of net investments. However, a continual increase in labour force may augment 
the process as more workers will be required to be equipped with capital. Thus, under 
the neoclassical structure, an increase in investment provisionally enriches the rate of 
growth of output and increase the level of output per worker. 
Net investments, gross investments minus investment ardent for replacing depreciated 
assets helps to determine the definite intensification in a country‟s actual value. On the 
contrary, for many countries there is not available data on net investment which may be 
considered as reliable. This is correct mostly for time series data. As a result, many 
empirical studies use gross investment in order to specify the resources accessible to 
increase a country‟s physical plant. For a great deal of countries, net national savings 
can be decomposed into government savings and private savings. Furthermore, the 
private savings can be further divided into corporate and household savings.  
  
Leff (1969) investigate of the impact of population growth on aggregate savings studied 
the life cycle of savings models that were linked to savings and demographic factors. 
Leff (1969) also incorporated effects on the household level and on the aggregate level 
too. Using the Leff (1969) structure, there is no similarities between current income and 
anticipated expenses as both consumptions and earnings are assumed to vary in 
various ways over the life cycle. With the life cycle savings, households are able to shift 
income between various time stages to acclimatise to the method of preferred 
disbursements. During time periods when earnings are to exceed the desired 
expenditures households end up saving and the reverse occurs when earnings do not 
exceed the desired expenditures. Leff (1969) asserts that savings are highest in the mid 
of an individual‟s life as they are saving for retirement. The major source of investment, 
the aggregate savings, is dependent on savings of households that are currently 
working and the dissaving of current retired households. Based on the life cycle savings 
theory, a decline in fertility influences savings as: there is a reduced burden on 
childbearing costs leading to less consumption and an increase in savings at a 
household level, known as the dependency effect; and also reduced fertility causes 
population ageing which results in relatively older households increasing. All in all, older 
households typically on average have a lesser rate of savings, which in results as whole 
reduced savings. In the scenario of a growing population, households that contain the 
young and those who are saving outstrip the those households that have the old or 
those of the dissaving. However, as a result, a growing population leads to an increase 
in aggregate savings; known as the growth effect. The dependency effect generally 
implies a negative relations between rapid population growth and savings , the growth 
effect on the other hand implies a positive relation to these factors.  
The dependency effect and rate of growth effect are both based on the life cycle 
hypothesis that is related to microeconomic theory. However, on the macroeconomic 
level, changes in factors such as age structure affect savings as an increase of younger 
groups may increase the consumption relative to the production with this reversing with 
an increase in older groups.         
  
Chapter – 3; Methodology 
 
The research methodology used to complete this research is based on secondary 
research. First, research will be conducted to comprehend the implication of historic and 
present macro-economic trends. This includes factors of GDP, economic growth, 
inflation, savings and investments. The first part of the research will also cover 
demographic trends in terms of fertility rate, per cent ageing population, life expectancy, 
and migration flows. This will be completed successfully by reviewing previously 
published articles, reports, and statistics on such factors. The main focus of the study 
was on EU-15 countries in which both economic and social trends will be studied. This 
includes countries;  
 Austria 
 Belgium 
 Denmark 
 Finland 
 France 
 Germany 
 Greece 
 Ireland 
 Italy 
 Luxembourg 
 Netherlands 
 Portugal 
 Spain 
 Sweden 
 United Kingdom 
 
Secondly, the research activity will extract data of economic impact and demographic 
shift to correlate it to each other. The data; as mentioned before will be extracted from 
government agencies.  
The results from the correlations will be scrutinised to gain an understanding of key 
elements such as social, political, and economic factors that are influencing the 
demographic change and in turn are resulting in specific economic environment. Once 
obtained data is thoroughly analysed, literature reviewed, results and discussion 
segment of the current research will be conducted. This section, as discussed below, 
will also include recommendations that are devised for improvement in the current 
economic policies of EU-15.       
  
Chapter – 4; Findings and Analyses 
 
4.1 Demographic change: dealing with potential future labour force shortages 
 
There are numerous definitions and types of labour market shortages. However, 
commonly they refer to a situation where there is a need for quantity of workers 
exceeds the available supply of them at a specific wage and working conditions at a 
specific place and point in time (OECD, 2003; Ruhs and Anderson, 2010, IOM, 2012). 
This paper distinguishes two main types of labour shortages;  
- Quantitative shortages which are caused by aggregate excess demand with 
insufficient workers to fill the overall demand.  
- Qualitative shortages which are caused shortage in specific skills, occupations or 
sectors with available workers not having the needed skills, preferences or 
information to fill the shortages.  
Keeping in mind the high unemployment rate in a majority of the regions of the EU 
which resulted from the „Great Recession‟ that began in 2009, quantitative labour 
market shortages are not considered a dire issue throughout a majority of the EU 
countries. However, the European Commission (2015) hypothesises that quantitative 
labour shortages have the potential to become an issue in the future, if the labour force 
begins to diminish as a result of demographic changes while labour demand at the 
same time increases as the economy of each country begins to recover.  
The decline of the labour supply in the EU-15 member states and EU-15 as a whole can 
be explained by demographic developments, by specifically analysing the decline in 
population of the working age and decline in the participation rate of the working-age 
population.    
According to Zimmermann et al. (2007) it is not easy to measure labour shortages and 
the basic labour market indicators for identification of labour shortages are rooted in 
economic theory and ambiguities affect the practical application of those indicators. 
  
Labour shortages, or job vacancies, or excess demand are similar in terms that mean 
open positions. Each of these are viewed as opposite to unemployment or excess 
supply. There is a chance for excess demand and excess supply to exists 
simultaneously. This may come from the fact that the labour skills that certain 
employers may want are not satisfied by the available supply thus resulting in positions 
being left vacant. According to OECD (2003) the discrepancy between labour demand 
(available jobs) and labour supply (skills of the unemployed) is defined as structural 
unemployment.  
In this section a deeper insight is obtained from the study of the labour markets 
examining the demand side and the supply side. Firstly, it is necessary to examine the 
demand side of the labour market. Demand for labour is often recognised as a classic 
early indicator of the vigour and well-being of the labour market. At a time when an 
economy is health, employers hire workers who as a result produce goods and services 
that the employers are able to sell the goods in the markets and earn a profit. Hiring 
workers increases the costs of employers and employers often want to hire workers at 
lower wages. Based on the law of demand for labour, an inverse relationship between 
demand for labour and the price of labour is established and represented in a downward 
sloping curve. Employers are only willing to hire extra workers when marginal revenue 
product of labour exceeds nominal wages. Based on the use of cost benefits, this allows 
to keep profits high. At the time that marginal revenue product of labour equals nominal 
wages, the business will have reached its maximum profits and then take the decision 
to no longer higher.            
According to projections by Eurostat (1997) there are four discrete characteristics that 
will exemplify the years between 1996 to 2020. They are as follows; 
1. The number of young people under 20 will fall by 11 per cent (9.5 million) 
2. Adults of working age will decline by 6.4 per cent (13 million).  
3. Retired adults will increase by 50 per cent to more than 37 million 
4. Most rapid expansion within retired adults will be mostly be those individuals 
aged over 80.  
  
Based on these characteristics it is evident that the ratio of elderly to the young will 
increase drastically resulting in dramatic changes within the population. Based on these 
assumptions, the median age will increase from 36 to 45 years older and the 
proportions of those individuals aged under 20 years and over 65 years will be revered 
by the year 2020. The three major groups of children/students,active population and 
retired adults are to witness a dramatic changes in both their numbers and proportions 
which is gives it a larger chance for a shortage in labour within the EU-15.  
A decrease in the population of the working-age individuals can be caused by a 
common output of the working age population that is greater than the input caused by 
factors of ageing and low fertility rate as evident in sections 2.2 and 2.3. Another factor 
that impacts this trend is from net emigration.  
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Figure 14- Beveridge Curve 2006-2014 (Source; Eurostat) 
  
Due to the low and decreasing fertility rate in the last fifteen years, the inflow of young 
people into the labour force is smaller than the outflow of older workers who retire. If 
activity rates remain the same, this will result in a decrease  of the labour force causing 
a constricted labour market in which labour demand surpasses labour supply. According 
to OECD (2003) towards the middle term of the projection, the ever increasing number 
of “baby-boomers” that are scheduled to retire will in some occupations will lead to a 
replacement demand that will be more difficult to fill from the domestic labour supplies in 
the EU.  
Coupled with the natural decline of the population of working aged people is also the 
decrease in population from net-emigration. That is, if there is an increase in the 
working age people that emigrate from a specific region (EU-15) than migrate to it, the 
result will be that the total population of working age result in a decline. It is evident that 
emigration reduces the amount of available workers in the EU-15 , it also reduce the 
potential labour market shortages in the country of destination, such as the United 
States, to which many working age EU-15 citizens emigrate too. From the process of 
migration, the receiving countries will be able to offset their labour shortages and amass 
skills. There is also the possibility that the receiving country will also amplify the average 
skill level of their own labour force, resulting in the sending countries experiencing a 
„brain drain‟ and decline in their labour supply. Based on the research it was found that 
the EU-15 population‟s young and educated workers, particularly in the IT industry, are 
immigrating to countries such as the USA, which is known for its high-tech companies 
situation in the Silicon Valley.       
The following tables; table 2 and table 3 exemplify the comparative contributions to the 
dependency ratios made by the varying populations groups.  
 Child dependency 
ratio (<15/15-64) 
Old age dependency 
ratio (65+/15-64) 
Old age dependency 
ratio (60+/20-59) 
EU (15) 26.1 23.1 37.2 
Austria 26.01 22.59 34.57 
Belgium 27.12 24.26 39.28 
Denmark 26.01 22.50 34.76 
Finland 28.48 21.46 34.22 
France 29.70 23.26 37.37 
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Germany 23.71 22.80 36.63 
Greece 24.55 23.36 40.36 
Ireland 37.24 17.77 29.75 
Italy 21.41 20.91 33.45 
Luxembourg 27.41 20.91 33.45 
Netherlands 26.90 19.47 30.70 
Portugal 25.96 21.68 36.83 
Spain 24.00 22.62 38.20 
Sweden 29.59 27.42 41.20 
UK 29.82 24.24 37.75 
Table 2- Dependency ratio: child dependency and old age dependency ratios (Source; Eurostat, Demographic Yearbook, 
2000) 
 Child dependency 
ratio (<15/15-64) 
Old age dependency 
ratio (65+/15-64) 
Old age dependency 
ratio (60+/20-59) 
EU (15)    
Austria 22.00 28.00 49.00 
Belgium 26.00 28.00 55.00 
Denmark 27.00 28.00 56.00 
Finland 26.00 31.00 57.00 
France 29.00 29.00 57.00 
Germany 20.00 32.00 52.00 
Greece 22.00 31.00 53.00 
Ireland 33.00 19.00 51.00 
Italy 22.00 33.00 55.00 
Luxembourg 26.00 21.00 47.00 
Netherlands 26.00 27.00 53.00 
Portugal 22.00 29.00 51.00 
Spain 23.00 27.00 50.00 
Sweden 27.00 31.00 58.00 
UK 27.00 28.00 55.00 
Table 3- - Dependency ratio: child dependency and old age dependency ratios (Source; World Bank 2015) 
Age dependency ratios represent the ratio of persons in a population who are the 
dependent age groups; considered as under the age of 15 and over the age of 65 
versus those that are considered to the economically productive age group 15-64. The 
dependency ratio was used here as an economic indicator for the financial 
encumbrance placed on the population that is productive by those who are not.  
The current dependency ratios are relatively high for the following reasons; the 
population born after World War II are now in the retirement population and fertility has 
declined even more since the 1980s. With more individuals entering the retirement age 
and no longer fit to participate in the labour market there will be a need of increased 
  
working or „productive age‟ individuals. However, it is evident that the number of 
productive people to the retiring population has decreased and is projected to decrease 
due to low fertility rates. Thus, the outflow of workers will not be compensated for the 
inflow of workers due to the large margins and gaps of age in a population.  
Figure 16 illustrates the age differences occurring between the productive working 
groups aged 15-64 to those of older individuals dependent on the productive group 
aged 65+. The trends are a comparison of population statistics of year 1994 and 2014. 
From the trends it is obvious that since 1994 the productive group‟s percentage in the 
population has decreased greatly compared to 2014. Also, the dependent individuals 
aged 65+ has increased since 1994. Based on this comparison, it is concluded that 
labour shortages in the EU-15 market will occur as the ratio of dependency is increasing 
and the productive age groups 15-64‟s population percentage is decreasing. To project 
future labour shortages based on this premise, it is essential to project future population 
trends. By keeping the factors similar to the trends present in 2014 a projection is made 
of the future population. 
 
Figure 16- Population Pyramids, EU-15, 1994-2014 (Source; Eurostat) 
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Based on the projections of population in 2080 it is evident that there is a decrease of 
percentage of population aged 15-64 with an increase in percentage of population aged 
65+. Based on these trends, it can be concluded that EU-15 countries are facing a 
possible labour force shortage due to a lack of individuals present in the economically 
productive population with a greater burden of individuals in the dependency groups. 
 
4.2 Immigration and the EU labour market  
 
According to the EU (2007) the third main factor that drives demographic change and is 
considered the most volatile for developed societies is international migration. By the 
second half of the 20th century, larger countries of Europe were experiencing a trend 
change from emigration to immigration. Europe as a whole is unable to identify the 
exact number of migrants that a resident to Europe. This may be due to the fact that 
Figure 17- Population pyramids, EU-15, 2014 and 2080 (Source; Eurostat, 2015) 
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European countries collect data on nationality instead of place of country of birth making 
it difficult to identify first-generation immigrants once they have obtained citizenship in 
their host country. However, the UN had estimated that there may be over 40 million 
migrants living in the EU-27 member states, with 3 per cent of the migrants being 
refugees. Europe is home to 8.8 per cent of migrants in its population of 728 million 
which is considered to be higher than many less developed regions of the world who 
only have 1.4 per cent of migrants in their total population. The illustration below 
presents the main destinations for immigrants that are coming from non-EU countries.  
 
Figure 18- Annual Crude Net Migration Rate 2010, in thousands (Source; Eurostat National Data) 
Based on the figure above, the migration flows for Italy and Spain had accounted for 
two-thirds of its total population were impacted by the countries‟ decision to regularise 
illegal migrants. Based on the previous trends, if immigration were to stay at this high 
level, then the EU‟s working age population is predicted to continue to grow until 2030, 
instead of beginning to decline as it did in 2011 based on the baseline scenario of the 
Eurostat demographic projection into the upcoming years.   
It is evident that EU-15 and EU as a whole is facing an impending problem in the labour 
market which will become prominent in the next few decades. Various academics have 
proposed using immigration to help postpone the onset of population decline and 
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ageing. However, there is a possibility that this policy will not reverse the trend that is 
currently set for a demographic shift. According to Eurostat (ND) the 2004-2050 
population projections illustrate that the EU population until 2025 will be mainly from net 
migration. It is evident from Kyrieri (2007) assertion that international migration has the 
ability to play an important role in solving future labour market shortages; however, its 
impact on the population ageing is to be very small. According to a UN scenario 
calculation, in order to stop the progress or reverse the ageing population, a substantial 
and increased flow of young migrants is required (Commission Communication, 2005). 
Based on the UN report, to keep the age structure in Germany unchanged, an 
approximate of over 3 million migrants per year would need to be admitted through the 
country‟s borders (UN, 2006). Thus, it is clear that increased migration is not able to 
prevent ageing. However, it can help in contributing to the decrease or elimination of 
labour market shortages. According to the figure below, it is evident from the 
comparison of natural rate of population growth and migration rate that various member 
states in the EU have already been positively impacted in postponing their population 
decline (UN, 2006).   
 
Figure 19- Net Migration and Natural Population Growth (average 2001-2004) (Source; European Commission, 2007) 
  
   Based on the projections from the previous sections, the ageing population in the 
workforce is bound to impact the EU-15 population with populace aged 15-64 
decreasing by one million annually after 2013. The continuation of these trends is bound 
to result in generation of shortages in the labour market. How, this will also act as a 
major attraction force for international migration into the EU. A pushing factor to aid in 
the pull is the high population growth in neighbouring countries of Europe, such as 
many African countries, that are known to have poor economic performance and 
political instability. 
Various scenario calculations, such as the study conducted by Bomsdorf and Babel 
(2005) express that a total extra increase in the German population of 2.5 million until 
the year 2050 can be achieved through;  
 An increase in TFR by 0.1 
 An increase in life expectancy by 2.67 years 
 An increase in annual net immigration by 45.000 persons    
This varies from the baseline scenario set by Eurostat which makes an assumption of a 
decline in 12 million with other factors remaining unchanged. Such scenario calculations 
present that, over many decades, considerably small changes in fertility are bound to 
have a very large impact on future demographic developments. This is evident from the 
table below. 
Table 4- Change in German population by 2050 (in 1000 persons) compared to the baseline projection, due to a 10% or 20% 
change in fertility and in net migration. (Source; Bombsdorf and Babel, 2007) 
Change in % -20% - 10% 10% 20% 
- In the fertility rate - 6, 117 - 3,122 3,248 6,623 
- In the net migration - 1, 688 - 844 844 1,688 
 
4.3 EU-15 Economic growth and age structure of the population 
 
There is evidence that distinct patterns of age shares effects on the growth of GDP per 
worker are illustrated with a strong positive effect from 50-64 age group and negative 
effect from the 65+ age group while younger age groups are known to have vague 
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effects. The study looks to examine the age structure effects on economic growth in EU-
15 countries; made of 15 countries with economic data from World Bank and 
demographic data from Eurostat, are studied in a country panel with a 5-year data 
ranging from 1980-2014. The basic model framework used is that of the transitional 
Solow growth model which connects human capital and resource of labour is produced 
when an investment is made in education of the populace. To comprehend the impact 
that economic growth and age structure has on a population the following was used;  
 
 
       (    )[      (   )]  (      )          
 
 
 
Based on equation above, if there is no changes in the age structure, saving rate, 
depreciation, workforce growth, or potential technology level the economy will result in a 
stationary state which means that growth practically stops. However, if there are 
changes in the stated variables, the variables shift the steady state income to which the 
economy is conversing in and results in transitional growth rate. This means that the 
economy can be thought of aiming for a continuously moving target. A set-back of the 
equation derived above is that varying structure of age will also be applicable to the 
variations which are found among transitional growth rate which is considered to be 
short-run. It is common for growth models to assume that the age structure if constant 
and is thus safe to ignore. However, in real-world problems and scenarios, the age 
structure of the populace is swiftly ageing and fluctuating at a rapid pace. The impact on 
the growth rate in the current model is country and time specific as the dependency on 
the rate of technological conjunction is proportional to  .  
The table below represents a replication of the data that is described before and 
compared based on year groups of new being 2000-2014 and old being 1990-1999. 
The common features of the pooled old regressions in regards to the age hump 
coefficients are clearly identified, however, the hump shows movements of tilting to the 
more negative effect from young adult, thus moving closer to the 1990-1999 data set 
results. The adj. R2 is showing signs of decrease but the coefficient on the initial income 
actually becomes more significant from a statistical point of view once the dummy 
period is added.   
  
Table 5 demonstrates in its first two columns the unrestricted estimated on annual and 
ten-year data. The basic bell shape of the age coefficients is kept constant even though 
it shows movements of tilting to a more positive ageing effects when the ten-year 
periods are used. With the case scenario of a ten year period, there are similar results 
for other parameters. However, in the case of the annual set there is issues that arise 
with investment restrictions which is scarcely accepted and a more positive coefficient 
for initial income, although it is considered insignificant.  
With the implementation of restrictions, there a fairly similar results on annual sample 
and ten-year period sample without the change in age coefficients. By adding the 
preceding period dummy on the annual data leaves a blank or takes from the individual 
coefficients of their significance but under this case significance for the age shares as a 
consolidated group are preserved, but hardly. In the scenario of the ten-year data 
results also confirm the previous 5 year results and annual data.  
It is evident that variables such as (1/Γ, ln I, ln y0) has the potential of causing a biased 
estimate. To sum up the evidence; there are convergence parameters that are not 
varying in the EU-15 sample from 1990-1999 and 2000-2014. Further, the age profiles 
are considered to be almost the same and still dependent on the period of length with a 
negative emphasis being placed on either the young or the old. Lastly, there also seems 
to be evidence in a great quantity in the time-extended sample which omits country-
specific effects.       
  
 
Table 5- Replication of 5-year regressions on new data sampling using periods up to 2000-2014. For comparison to old 
sample of 1990-1999. Using EU-15. 
     
  
 
Table 6- Annual and ten-year average regressions on data sampled 2000-2014 using EU-15 
Another key factor of the study was total fertility rate. A correlation was made between 
the gross domestic products of the EU-15 countries as a whole to their consolidated 
total fertility rates from the years 2007 to 2011 from available data obtained from 
Eurostat. The correlation was able to document positive change, negative change and 
no change over the progression of the year in terms of the two factors being analysed. 
Based on the analysis of the data it was found that GDP of the EU-15 countries went 
from a 20 per cent positive change to a 30 per cent positive change from 2007 to 2011 
  
respectively. Also, Total fertility rate from these years went from 0 per cent negative 
change to a 24 per cent negative change from 2007 to 2011.  
 
Figure 20- Comparison of TFR to GDP in EU-15 from 2007-2011 (Source; Eurostat) 
It is possible that the decrease in negative change for GDP and increase in negative in 
TFR may be from the greater participating of females in the workforce in the EU-15 
economy. This may be interpreted as being that more females are participating in the 
economy and are having lesser children or no children at all. This may be because 
females that are participating in the economy want to focus more on their careers that 
live with the social stigma of raising children. Thus, it can be concluded that TFR‟s 
decrease may actually help the macro-economy of the EU-15, but to an extent. Based 
on future population projections by Eurostat, it is evident that there will be labour 
shortages as the TFR of the area had decreased. The aid to the macro-economy by 
females having less or no children is temporary with its effects temporary, but in the 
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future these trends may work in the opposite position if there are not younger individuals 
to take up the labour positions of older workers that are retiring.  
 
Table 7- Highest correlations and corresponding lags of TFR with various indicators of economic recession by country, 2000-
2011 (Source; Eurostat, 2014) 
It is evident that changes sustained in fertility are partially followed by changes in the 
economy, based on the table above, there comes a mean lag of fewer than two years. 
Table 6 above illustrates the correlations between the time series of the changes in total 
fertility rate and a selection of economic indicators of an economic crisis in each 
selected European country. The main point of this test was to look for potential 
connections between economic conditions and the changes that are taking place in 
fertility behaviour. The correlations were calculated by also considering a lag in total 
  
fertility rate from 0 to 3 years. Thus, four correlations were calculated for each country 
and indicator. The table above, thus represents the highest values of the correlations 
either it being negative or positive, coupled with the lag at which each of those 
computations were found. To place an emphasis and remained focused on the effect of 
economic crisis, data from years 2000 to 2011 was used in order to calculate the annual 
data obtained from Eurostat databases. Based on the correlations it was found that the 
usual economic indicator of economic growth based on the GDP of each country there 
is an expected relationship of negative changes in GDP corresponding to negative 
changes in TFR, with a delay, resulting in a high positive correlation at specific lags as 
highlighted in the table.  
Aside from GDP, another indicator chosen was actual individual consumption (AIC) as it 
provides a more resolute measure for material welfare conditions of households since it 
refers to goods and services consumed by individuals regardless of if those goods were 
purchased by the individuals, or governments, non-profit organisations. By correlating 
the changes in AIC to TFR, the study was able to analyse the impact of changing 
material situations of households on fertility behaviour; rather than the living standards 
of a country, which is measured instead using GDP. Next, the annual unemployment 
rate of age group of 15-49 was used as an indicator represented with (UNE). The 
relationship that was anticipated is those with a negative sign as they mean that a 
positive change of the UNE are correlated with a negative change of the lagged total 
fertility rate. Lastly, the indicator used in Table 6 was the annual average consumer‟s 
confidence index represented by (CCI). This meant for the indicator to compute the 
mawkishness of economic uncertainty. The correlation between changes in CCCI and 
lagged changes in TFR were expected to be positive.     
 
4.4 Demography, growth and technology adoption in the EU-15 
 
The estimated regressions that were conceived above indicate that there is a stable and 
strong connection between variations in age distribution within the populace and the 
  
growth process depending on various controls. The regression uses a set of controls to 
broadly factor flows including, capital investment, potential workforce changes, and 
technological convergence. The patterns that were demonstrated in the regression 
show, that young adults play an imperative role in the convergence process and play 
also an imperative role in rate of absorption of new technology from other countries. 
This can be only if the education of these individuals is more recent, being higher than 
that in the holder workforce. There are many reasons for which the older workforce is 
more hesitant to learn and adopt new technologies as methods of production. It is come 
to think that information technology and computers are a concept that younger 
generations of workforce will have a more advantage in as they are being educated with 
the technology.  
Based on a study conducted by Skirbekk (2004) capabilities of individuals at different 
ages begin to deteriorate at very early ages, such as learning abilities, while other 
abilities are known to continue growing with age, such as verbal abilities well into middle 
age allowing compensation as an individual ages and changes jobs within their career. 
Therefore, based on this study alone, the youth and the elderly have different sets of 
skills within their profile and there is evidence that suggests that younger and older 
labour are complements of one another (Macunovich, 2002).  
Based on the reasoning of both Skirbekk (2004) and Macunovich (2002) it can be 
concluded that the efficiency of standard production has the tendency to increase with 
experience as it only requires managerial skills like good organisation, a stable and no 
mobile workforce. However, the efficiency of technology adoption requires the individual 
to have fast learning skills and flexible labour that is able to move around with ease 
when it comes to experimentation of new technologies.  
Based on the current study‟s macro-economic perspective it is difficult to determine how 
reasonable the above explanations are. However, the age-growth relations that were 
illustrated in the previous section do not rebut the possibility of this young-old 
complementarity being an imperative factor behind economic growth. According to 
Wasmer (2004) the hypothesis which have created can be explained why the rigid 
European labour markets are more efficient and effective in using mature technologies, 
  
while on the other hand, the flexible American markets has a comparative advantage 
when it comes to using more innovative technologies. Based on Wasmer (2004) it is 
required that the changing proportion of various age groups in the workforce may lead 
to requiring a change in both labour market institution and policies in order to be able to 
take advantage of varying economic growth opportunities.  
The results of the current study can be used to explained, coupled with other 
perspectives, the change in composition of labour supply. It is evident from the current 
study, that the composition of supply and demand of capital changes are based on age 
structure. A more ageing population demands a shift in more labour intensive services 
with more varying technological characteristics than compared to large-scale production 
of goods. Thus, increases in elderly dependency ratios have deteriorating effects on 
productivity growth. Another cause for this may be the crowding impact on private 
investments by public investments where there is no way to concretely measure the 
productivity effects.  
There is a slow shifting impact of age structure with the level of development. The 
current model used in this study assumes that the shift impact is connected to the 
convergence process. This process means that demographic variables have a higher 
change impact on the growth rate of countries with a certain level of income. The 
reason for a hump shift to take place under this model is due to high life expectancy 
which means that there is a higher remuneration to human capital investments at the 
start of the life cycle. This effect has the tendency to shift the start of working life 
forward from ages 15 to age 20 and about for other EU countries. This occurs because 
higher life expectancy is connected with improved wellbeing and lower illness and 
impermanence over the entire life time-frame that involves working. This in turn 
increase the proportion of able and fit workers made available in the middle-aged 
section of the age distribution curve. However, mortality gains were mostly taking place 
at ages above retirement within the late part of the 20th century. Thus, dependency 
ratios begin to increase again with the elderly dependency rate that is dominating the 
whole process. Based on the estimates that have been reported in the current study, 
the dominating factor of dependency ratios has had inhibiting effect on each country‟s 
  
growth rate and will continue to do so for the remaining part of the 21st century. Based 
on the data collected, the higher life expectancy impact will tilt the hump of the 
regression resulting in a negative effect on elderly proportion becomes larger and may 
become positive.  
Many pensions systems throughout Euro-area have witnessed actual retirement ages 
decreasing, which is considered to be a contributing factor for the negative effects of 
elderly as described before. However, these trends and their effects can be reversed for 
the positive if reasonable incentives are given coupled with increasing health. For 
example, Sweden has seen an increase in elderly labour participation which may result 
in beneficial effects for labour productivity for the country.                            
4.5 Labour market participation and the unemployment rate of young people 
 
By 2000, more than 20 million people were unemployed in 28 countries of the European 
Union, which corresponds to an approximate of 9.2 per cent of the total labour force. 
Unemployment in the euro-are (EA-19) also follows about the same trends as that of 
EU-28. Nonetheless, between 200 and the start of 2004 the unemployment rate in EA-
19 was below that recorded in EU-28. During the economic crisis that took place in 
2009, unemployment increased at a rapid pace with the exception of the years 2010 
and 2011 where it only declined temporarily. The unemployment level peaked at 19.2 
million in the second quarter of the year 2013 before it began to decrease in the second 
part of 2013 and the beginning of 2014 all the way towards the end of the year. The 
trends described have been illustrated in the figure below.  
     
 
 
 
 
Figure 21- Unemployed persons, in millions, EU-28 and EA-19, 2000-2015 (Source; Eurostat) 
  
Youth (ages 15-35) unemployment rates are seen as being higher, considerably more 
than double, than compared to unemployment rates of all ages as illustrated in figure 18 
below. The economic crisis had severely impacted the youth with the second quarter of 
2008 seeing youth unemployment rate taking an upward trend to peak at 23.8 per cent 
in the first quarter of 2013 before beginning to decrease to 21.4 per cent towards the 
end of 2014.   
 
Figure 22- Youth unemployment rates, EU-28 and EA-19. 2000-2015 (Source; Eurostat) 
Employment rates are seen to be generally lower for both women and older worker. 
Based on our findings for 2014, the employment rate for men was at 70.1 per cent in the 
EU-28 than compared to 59.6 per cent for women which is evident from figure 20. Also, 
male employment rates were seen to be unswervingly larger than those for women 
throughout all EU-15 member states in 2014. Based on figure 20, Italy and Greece had 
recounted gender differences of 16 to 18 percentage points for statistics detaining 
employment rates. For both these countries this shows the fact they stated the 
nethermost and second nethermost female employment rates. However, in countries 
  
such as Finland and Sweden, there is very little difference between the employment 
rates of both genders. Just as with female employment, there is also evidence that 
suggests employment rate for older workers grouped in ages 55-64 has increased at a 
rapid pace, even though the countries were facing a financial and economic crisis. 
Based on figure 19, in 2014 there were 11 EU-28 member states that had higher 
employment rates for older workers that were between 50 per cent and 66 per cent. 
However, for the EU-15 countries the highest employment rate for older workers were 
found in Sweden, have 74.0 per cent employment.   
 
Figure 23- Employment rates (%) by age group, 2014 (Source, Eurostat) 
 
 
Figure 24- Employment rates by gender and age group 15-64, 2014 (Source; Eurostat) 
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Chapter- 5; Discussion and Recommendations 
 
In the neoclassical growth model produced by Solow (1956) it is hypothesised that a 
negative correlation between economic growth and population exists. Generally 
speaking, fertility, population growth, and mortality resulted in being negatively and 
population size resulted in being positively related to per capita output growth. In 
commonly used growth equations which include the factors of growth rate of the total 
population as the sole demographic variable led to population growth to result in having 
no effect on economic growth. However, there is an indication that demography does 
indeed matter but what must be exempted is the assumption of a constant age 
distribution of the population as it subliminally assumes so in a majority of economic 
growth correlations and regressions. If the research considered the age structure of the 
population then empirical growth regressions are able to indicate and identify a 
significant and robust correlation between demographic change and economic growth.     
For the study, a model was planned to calculate how fluctuating age structures affected 
the rate of economic growth. As resulted, increasing dependency rates in the population 
had negative effects on per capita GDP growth. This is seen as a simple accounting 
effect evident from 1990-1999 and 2000-2014. It suggests that per worker GDP will be 
unfavourably affected with an increase in dependency rates. The various contrivances 
that are influencing this result vary significantly and include; time constraints on a 
working population by having to spend more time on unaccounted for household 
responsibilities to demand a shift towards services with lower productivity growth. It is 
also plausible the involvement of an increase in comparative prices for capital because 
of lower savings rates. Based on these variables, it is generally accepted and concluded 
from the study that the ageing population is triggering a dampening effect on the 
economic growth process.  
It was found that the oldest part of the working population (64+ years of age) is not 
appropriately participating as a growth-stimulator due to its lack of grasping 
technological advances and convergence processes. For the countries in the EU-15 
  
and European Union as a whole, an ageing workforce is a potential matter of concern in 
terms of policy and future projections for bankrolling the care of an ageing populations. 
The middle-aged adults aged between 50-64 years have a positive effect on the macro-
economy of the EU-15 countries but retirees aged 65+ have a negative impact. It is safe 
to conclude that as the baby boomers are getting older, an ageing workforce appears to 
present slight problems for general EU-15 growth, until they begin to retire. In a majority 
of the EU-15 countries this is yet to come, although in countries like Sweden it is in the 
offing while in Germany this stage if beginning to pass.  
In our discussion in chapter 4, the study analysed the growth prospects based on 
results obtained from the regression analysis. Based on the quantitative analysis, the 
policy perspectives that come to light are of concern. Many analysts (Zhang et al, 2003; 
Wasmer, 2004; Fotakis and Peschner, 2015) have been hoping for an increase rather 
than a decrease in growth so that they may deal with future increases of the elderly 
dependency rates. However, with the current trends it seems difficult for such hopes to 
come true. Based on the continuation of current trends there will clearly be problems 
when it comes to financing pensions and elderly care. However, there is still some delay 
for this situation to occur allowing countries in the EU-15 to prepare themselves with 
budgetary problems that will occur in the future.  
Demographic structures and trends are not concrete and therefore may be able to 
change. However, it is difficult for trends to change for the older half of the distribution of 
age. But the younger half of the distribution of age can be affected to a great extent with 
fertility and migration. However, this cannot be possible without the use of costs and 
central policy issues that may arise.           
5.1 Key Recommendations 
 
Based on the study, it is obvious that EU-15 countries will be facing a disparity within 
the population in the coming years. Although the rising number of ageing people is 
affecting this trend we cannot produce recommendations to control the percentage of 
ageing populations that are not barbaric, cruel, and violate human rights. Therefore, the 
European policy makers need focus on the total fertility rate which is affecting the 
  
overall demographic shift. Based on the study, countries such as France and Ireland 
have been able to maintain consistent rankings of having a higher fertility rate than 
paralleled to other Eu-15 countries. Based on the research conducted it is 
recommended that other EU-15 countries follow the French public policy to increase 
fertility rate.  
From the earlier portion of 2000s France has shown a consistency in topping European 
rankings for its fertility rate. France had faced twenty years of decline in 1970s-1980s 
for fertility rate but it began to pick up its pace in 1990s, as evident from figure 3. Since 
the 1990s the country had registered a score just below the hypothetical brink of 2.1 
children per woman, this is considered to be a secure score to produce a steady 
population. Policy makers in central and southern Europe are considered with the falling 
rate of live births per woman, which has reached 1.58 live births per woman. Recently, 
Catholic culture countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Italy have experienced drastic 
fall in number of births per woman, registering to either 1.4 or 1.3 live births per woman. 
Germany and Austria have also seen a decline in TFR. However, France takes a more 
reasonable approach to sustaining fertility rates by combing the notion of a modern 
family grounded on gender egalitarianism and government policies that effective and 
strong. In France, the kind of custom is much more lenient which allows late marriages, 
reconstituted families, single parents and more frequent births outside marriages and 
divorces. According to Ined demographer Laurent Toulemon, people are far less 
concerned about the outlook for family as an institution (Chemin, 2015). This open-
ended approach to families has had a positive impact on the statistics of the country by 
producing 1.8 children per woman.  
Thus, to achieve higher fertility rate, society needs to distance itself from a traditional 
family model that centres on the figure of the sole earner or income provider. However, 
families that even keep away from traditional structure still need support from the state. 
In the case of France, generous welfare policies help families with aid exceeding 3.5 per 
cent of gross domestic product. This spending is substantively lower in countries such 
as Italy with 2 per cent of aid exceeding GDP, and 1.5 per cent in Spain, Portugal and 
Greece.  
  
Policies to boost the birth rate should promote paternalistic companies to award 
bonuses to parents of young children. In the case of France, after the war in 1930s, the 
state took over and set up family allowance system for parents which was backed by tax 
incentives. In addition to these financial advantages, the state also gave amenities for 
infants and small children. Other countries in the EU-15 have not taken these steps. For 
example, Germans still hold to the traditional ideology of children being the sole 
responsibility of the parents. Therefore, government involvement is not present or 
accepted in many households. This ideology holds roots throughout many communist 
bloc countries and those which had witnessed a Nazi regime hold. Societal changes 
and how to influence them should be taken into consideration by policy makers in order 
to sustain a logically growing population.   
Therefore, it is recommended that EU-15 countries and other countries throughout 
Europe emulate the policies found in France. This will include slowly eliminating the 
traditional social norms of family and acceptance of a restructured family where 
marriage is not needed for the production of children. Further, it is recommended that 
women in the country‟s workforce be given flexibility in terms of job security and 
maternal leave with pay at the time of child birthing. It is also recommended that 
governments provide more support to families both financially and with providing 
facilities such as infant care units or centres and day-cares and nurseries. These steps 
are bound to have a positive impact on the sustainable growth of the population as 
witnessed in countries such as France and Nordic countries such as Norway. Only with 
the positive growth of the total fertility rate will EU-15 countries be able to sustain a 
future economy that is able to bring an equilibrium in the outflow of retired workers over 
the age of 65 and the inflow of a more active population ready to take up vacant 
positions in the labour market.              
 
  
Chapter – 6; Conclusion 
 
The last few years has seen an increased awareness and concern of the undeviating 
effect of populace age structure on the macro-economy especially economic growth and 
monetary policy. This current study provided a review of the academic literature that 
relates vicissitudes in the demographic structure to the economic growth and further 
went on to connect empirical correlations for the EU-15 countries over the years of 2000 
to 2014. It was then recognised that demographic age structure plays a role as an 
imperative and robust determinant with respect to including various economic variables 
of economic growth rates from 2000-2014. Age structure is easier to forecast for the 
next three decades that compared to forecasting economic and social indicators. Thus, 
the report included empirical estimations of future implications related to demographic 
changes on economic growth for EU-15 countries up to the years 2050-2080.  
The study conducted also reviewed the concept of demographic transitions and its 
implications for economic growth in EU-15 countries. It is evident that more developed 
and industrialised countries have gone through the phase of classical demographic 
transition defined with decreasing mortality rates, decline in fertility rates, and the baby 
boom and its declined from years after World War II. In the industrialised countries of 
EU-15, the demographic change in the time following World War II resulted in 
demographic dividend that had begun in the 1980s when the generation of baby 
boomers had entered the labour market due to the growth rate of the population being 
slower than the growth rate of the working age population. The current demographic 
divide is a direct result of the population ageing. There is a difference in the growth 
rates of working percentage of the population to the total population in the EU-countries. 
The second demographic dividend that is currently taking place emphasises on the part 
that demographic change plays for the output-per-worker ratio, known as productivity 
component. It is evident from the study that demographic trends has an impact on the 
productivity components through impacting savings, investments, and technological 
changes.  
  
It is evident that fertility rates will continue to decrease, thus resulting as an 
demographic burden being predicted as the growth rate of the working age population 
continues to decline leading to a shortage of growth rate of the overall population. This 
is a social issue which needs to be tackled keeping in mind that EU-15 countries are 
democratic countries that do not allow for the involvement of government in personal 
matters. This particular matter will be a bit difficult to handle in developed countries as 
women of the countries have been emancipated and bestowed civil liberties that should 
not be violated in any way. However, the governments of the countries within the EU-15 
and the European Union as a whole should analyse the steps that have been taken by 
France in terms of stimulating fertility rates. This includes breakdown of the traditional 
family norms and notions of a traditional family structure.   
To summarise, the report supports the argument that the demographic factors such as 
fertility rate and ageing population matter for economic growth as equally as factors of 
technological change, innovative and political changes. Analysing the recent 
econometric estimates and population projections by Eurostat it is concluded that it will 
be difficult to avoid the decline in GDP growth rates as it declines with more severe 
demographic changes which may result in slow or negative rates of workforce growth.      
6.1 Further research opportunities 
 
This section includes recommendations that recognise different key areas of that can be 
used for further research with the main aim of comprehending how shifting 
demographics impact various economic components. As seen throughout the present 
study, an emphasis was placed on fertility rates and ageing populations to understand 
their impact on EU-15 economy. Extending the concept to other demographic factors 
can bring a different insight on how those factors impact both the macro- and micro- 
economy. The following recommendations can be used for further research;  
1. Establish the extent to which demographics of rapid ageing, low fertility rate, and 
overall population numbers impact a particular economy- this will include a 
detailed investigation of how these demographic factors have impacted two 
varying economies, such as Ireland who has not seen drastic demographic shifts, 
  
to Germany, a country that has seen drastic demographic shifts. This will give 
evidence of to what extent demographic factors can have an impact on a 
country‟s macro-economy. 
2. Impact of migrant workers on demographics- research is needed to understand 
how migrant workers in the Euro-area are impacting the demographic statistics of 
countries and further on the economy. Getting this insight will allow the 
researcher to obtain critical knowledge on how population shifts can be managed 
through the use of migrant workers. Furthermore, it will also provide insight on 
how countries with more migrant workers fare in terms of economic growth than 
compared to other Euro area countries that do not allow an influx of migrant 
workers.  
3. Although the current study touched briefly on political policies. It is essential to 
investigate how political policies of Euro-area countries separately and 
consolidated have had an impact on the economic on a macro- and micro- level. 
Political policies implanted by separate countries in the Euro-area will give insight 
on individual country‟s standing on economic growth and monetary policies. This 
than can be brought together to understand how individual political policies may 
have an impact on the Euro-area on a whole.  
4. Social implications of demographics- this study was a bit restricted in the current 
research as it focused more on empirical evidence to support the impact that 
demographics had on economy. However, a further study on the social policies 
of individual Euro-area countries can give insight as to why, for example, 
countries such as Ireland are not facing issues in terms of lower fertility rates 
than compared to a country such as Germany. Social policies set by society play 
a crucial role in setting trends. Not being able to do this currently had limited the 
researcher‟s capacity to comprehend how social setting of various populations 
based on specific countries could impact their psychological choice of having 
more or less children. Therefore, a future study needs to investigate how 
populations in different Euro-area countries bring about a demographic shift 
based on their social environments, this will lead to insight on how particular 
  
societies are seeing no drastic changes to their population while still being able 
to maintain a positive economic environment.  
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